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This is a time of spirited debate about regulatory competition in Europe. 
Discussions about competitive lawmaking abound. At the same time, the 
introduction of the European Company and the further harmonization attempts 
by the European Commission puts questions about the necessity of EU 
intervention into the company laws regulated by the member states. We, 
however, see no cause for excitement on either front. 
This article explains why not, drawing on analytical tools from law and 
economics. Analyzing the history of EU company law, we locate a stable non-
competitive equilibrium, which prevails in the EU. This equilibrium follows 
from member states that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking 
authority regarding company law issues. Since then, stability has ruled. The 
agenda-setting in EU company law changed little during the existence of the 
EU. Operative incentives, market structure, and regulatory results have been 
more constant than dynamic, even as recent case law of the European Court of 
Justice triggered a loud discussion about competitive lawmaking in the EU. 
 
Keywords: Company Law, Legal Evolution, Regulatory Competition.  




The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of company law at 
the EU and member state level. Its emphasis is on elucidating lawmaking 
processes, and not on comparing legal rules and doctrines. The aim 
therefore is to explain and assess the process by which company law 
evolves, rather than to evaluate the content of the law in several 
jurisdictions.1 This article seeks to address the questions of which parties 
                                                     
1 In order to explain and evaluate the law, it is necessary to understand the process by 
which the law emerges, changes or persists. Cf. Ribstein (2001: 854) (‘[p]olicy reform 
should focus on the mechanisms of legal evolutions and markets rather than on the 
substantive provisions of business law.’); Van Alstine (2002) (arguing that, because of 
their potentially significant impact, the presence and extent of legal transaction costs 
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are responsible for setting the agenda for the reform of company law, 
and which considerations have been instrumental in stimulating the 
recent law reform strategies. 
 It is particularly tempting to compare the lawmaking process in 
Europe with the fundamental changes in company law that have 
occurred in the United States. There are two reasons that make the 
European Union and the United States suitable candidates for a 
comparative study. First, like the United States, the European Union can 
be viewed as a federation in which the individual countries retain 
considerable sovereignty, while at the same time allocating important 
prerogatives to a supranational government.2 Second, because US firms 
of all sizes have long been operating throughout the nationwide market 
without severe constraints regarding company law, the federal system 
has set a benchmark for the European Union.3 Viewed in this context, the 
emulation of the US approach regarding the evolution of company law 
seems logical. The development of legal rules in the United States as a 
result of competition between jurisdictions does appear to have essential 
lessons for Europe as it embarks on the modernization of company law 
in general. In the evolving pattern of EU company law, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have consistently 
avoided intervention into the national legislation of member states that 
has limited cross-border mobility of firms. The decision not to intervene 
has reinforced the member state strategy to avoid taking steps to create a 
market for corporate charters which could displace the autonomy of the 
member states.  
 Even though the threat of competition continues to be a defining 
feature of the market for closely held firms and holding companies, the 
possibility of free choice for publicly listed firms is thwarted due to tax 
                                                                                                                      
should be viewed as material inputs in decisions over the merit, form and structure of 
proposed changes in the law). 
2 In contrast to the United States, the European Union is not a superstate. However, it is 
more than just a free-trade area. It is an arrangement of countries, of which the shape and 
purpose have been adapted to changing circumstances with remarkable ingenuity. Cf. 
Micklitz and Weatherill (1997: 1-3) (arguing that unlike the US, the EU is not a 
federation of states, but a ‘market without a State’). 
3 Cf. Moussis (1992) (‘[t]he new enterprise policy of the Community has three broad 
objectives: to create a legal framework which lends itself to the setting up and 
development of enterprises in the Community; to create an economic environment which 
will help enterprises reach their full development in the internal market; and to promote 
cooperation between enterprises situated in different regions of the Community.’). 
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and other national law barriers, which have been reinforced by ECJ case 
law and harmonized rules. The combination of the real seat doctrine 
along with exit taxes proved capable of creating a stable, long-run non-
competitive equilibrium. With the core company law agenda defined by 
member states, the role of Brussels was merely to protect the cooperative 
agreement between member states—by limiting incentives for the 
emergence of a European Delaware—and to protect the public interest. 
Since its inception, the cooperative equilibrium has remained stable and 
largely intact, due to learning and adaptive changes made by the member 
states and the European Commission.  
 Despite the success of this enduring strategy, it is argued that political 
and legal transformations currently taking place in the EU, could disrupt 
these stable arrangements leading to the outbreak of free choice for 
companies. In this Article, we challenge recent claims that the ECJ has 
created, through Centros and its progeny of cases, the conditions for the 
transition to a fully-fledged competitive lawmaking regime. To date, the 
recent efforts of the ECJ to introduce free choice have so far done little 
to alter the stable equilibrium. To be sure, should the ECJ explicitly 
decide that the real seat is inconsistent with EU law, we cannot 
immediately expect an outbreak of competition-induced lawmaking, 
because mobility itself is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the emergence of regulatory competition.4   
 We show that besides the existing institutional barriers at the EU 
level, the potential for regulatory competition is constrained by other 
factors. First, the reincorporation costs in Europe make firms immobile. 
A recent judgment by the European Court of Justice, for instance, 
reinforces the Daily Mail5 judgment on hidden reserves, which will do 
little to stimulate demand for reincorporation.6 Second, we argue that 
national company law regulation and equity capitalization do not open 
up market opportunities for revenue seeking jurisdictions. The evidence 
shows that member states are responsive to managers and controlling 
shareholder on many company law issues that affect their private 
interests. Third, Europe’s linguistic and normative landscape is complex. 
These barriers cast doubt on the establishment of specialized court, like 
the Delaware Chancery Court, that could offer adjudication to managers 
                                                     
4 Cf. Bratton and McCahery (1997: 233-234) 
5 Case 81/87 The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex p. 
Daily Mail and General Trust Plc [1988] ECR 5483. 
6 Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002]. 
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and shareholders in other member states. Fourth, recent evidence 
suggests that a number of core members states which are highly 
vulnerable to the pressures of market competition, such as Germany and 
France, have taken steps to speed up the EU harmonization program, in 
order to stem the flow of out-migrating firms. Moreover, to the extent 
that the European Union continues to restrict member states from 
imposing franchise taxes, they will have few incentives to innovate.  
 But, as we have also seen in the US, the break-down of a highly 
stable equilibrium could occur rapidly.7 While it is difficult to foresee 
with certitude the conditions that could lead to the breakdown of an 
equilibrium strategy in the EU, it is argued, nevertheless, that the 
stability of the equilibrium depends crucially on the continued ability of 
member states to impose exist taxes on reincorporating firms. In light of 
the Centros progeny of cases, this strategy could be viewed as a violation 
of EU law, to the extent that it prohibits a firm from choosing a 
jurisdiction that reflects its preferences. Moreover, if one perceives 
member states as players of an indefinitely repeated game, it could be 
argued that domestic lawmakers will be induced to adjust their 
regulatory and fiscal strategies in order to avoid losing domestic firms to 
other member states. 
 This Article is divided into five sections. Section 2 recounts the 
evolution of the EU company law harmonization program from 1957 
through the modernization period of the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts. This account shows that the objective of the EU was to 
limit the right of establishment of pseudo-foreign companies and create 
barriers to the introduction of charter competition.8 This discussion goes 
on to describe the emergence of a non-intervention approach of EU 
lawmaking, excluding federal level regulators from disrupting state level 
accords between interested parties that are reflected in company law 
legislation. Finally, section 2 shows that the an early strategy of the EC 
to introduction of a truly EU-level company statute, to compete against 
the national level business forms, was blocked by the member states who 
viewed a EU company form as means to escape stricter national 
company law legislation.  
                                                     
7 Bratton and McCahery (2004) (explaining the factors that contributed to the 
introduction of the competition for charters at the beginning of the 20th century). 
8 Pseudo-foreign corporations are firms that are incorporated in one state but conduct a 
significant amount of their business in another state. 
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 Section 3 turns to examine the US market-based system for corporate 
charters. A notable feature of the EU is that it has always looked to the 
operation of Delaware and the charter market, initially with suspicion 
and more recently as an example of more efficient lawmaking. In the 
US, a growing number of commentators have argued that charter market 
is sub-optimal because Delaware faces little competition from the other 
states. The absence of competition in the charter market calls into 
question the description of Delaware, as emblematic of a particular form 
of market-based lawmaking, used by EU regulators to justify policies to 
reinforce the cooperative arrangement between member states. Ironically 
imperfections in the US charter market provide less than a firm basis for 
emulation by the EU lawmakers to reform the petrified company law 
rules, on the one hand, and the use of single instance of active 
competition between New Jersey and Delaware almost a century ago 
used to erect barriers to counter the so-called Delaware effect, on the 
other hand, suggest that the long term motivations of EU lawmakers 
have been guided by their own political preferences rather than an 
accurate account of the charter market and its impact on legal rules. 
 Meanwhile, the shape of EU law has been indirectly challenged by 
the ECJ’s line of cases starting with Centros, which sets in train the basis 
for the cross-border movement of administrative headquarters and the 
migration of new firms to more favorable jurisdictions. While we 
anticipate that this mobility trend will continue, we are skeptical that the 
structural conditions supporting the emergence of a EU Delaware can 
arise. Indeed, unlike New Jersey in 1888, the absence of a large interest 
group or a large source of rents that could stimulate a stable market for 
charters in the EU is evident. Moreover, it is unlikely that EU member 
states will, upon embarking on a non-cooperative path, backtrack, as did 
New Jersey when it enacted a series of anti-trust amendments in 1913. 
Thus, even if the circumstances change so that free mobility is an option, 
we are unlikely to witness a change in lawmaking preferences of the EU 
member states and the corresponding quality of legal rules. 
 Section 4 offers a brief conclusion. 
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2. THE CHANGING PATTERN OF EU LAWMAKING 
2.1 The Pre-EU Era 
Prior to the establishment of the European Union, Europe was 
characterized as a group of island jurisdictions, in which domestic 
lawmakers, acting in there own sphere, increase social welfare. Indeed, 
in line with traditional theories of law and society, lawmakers are 
supposedly public regarding actors who identify which rules are efficient 
across different firms, time and place, and replace inefficient rules 
accordingly. Yet in reality, legal rules and institutions have emerged and 
persisted for other reasons than welfare maximization. The application of 
the idea of path dependence to law shows that legal rules evolve along a 
historical path and can therefore become locked-in and resistant to 
change.9 
 It is submitted that in an island jurisdiction, legislators, judges, 
practitioners, regulatory agencies, professional groups and legal scholars 
constitute an elite lawmaking group that is responsible for interpreting, 
preserving and developing the law.10 As a result, the law is inherently 
conservative. First, the lawmaking elite treats the law as existing in its 
own right. In this view, the law is largely autonomous and operates in its 
own sphere.11 As one commentator puts it: ‘the means of creating law, 
the sources of law, come to be regarded as a given, almost as something 
sacrosanct, and change in these even when they are obviously deeply 
flawed is extremely difficult to achieve’.12 Second, the law is justified in 
its own terms. Lawmakers, i.e., persons trained in law and nothing else, 
search for the legitimacy of legal change, which makes the law typically 
backward-looking. To a large extent, this insulates legal evolution from 
social and economic change and it therefore displays a serious degree of 
path dependence.13 Thus seen, lawmakers in an island jurisdiction who 
                                                     
9 See Bebchuk and Roe (1999).  
10 See Ewald (1995: 499-500); Monateri (1998: 841). 
11 See Kelsen (1967) (arguing that law is autonomous and justified exclusively by its own 
foundations). Cf. Bourdieu (1987: 806); Posner (1987: 762).  
12 See Watson (1985: 119).  
13 See Watson (1978: 331) (‘[t]he undoubted respect which exists for law because it is 
law favours the status quo; it is what it is, that is regarded with something approaching 
reverence at times, not what it could be made to be.’).  
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view law as an autonomous discipline are an important source of 
defending the status quo.  
 Even if the lawmaking process does not display a tendency to 
introduce legal change, in their imperfect attempts to imitate other 
jurisdictions, reform minded lawmakers ‘unconsciously innovate by 
unwittingly acquiring some unexpected or unsought unique attributes’.14 
Indeed, one could roughly distinguish between conservative and 
innovative lawmakers. Conservative lawmakers, supported by the 
concentrated interest groups, deploy the existing legal doctrines, 
principles, culture and increasing returns benefits to protect the status 
quo and thwart legal change. Reform-minded lawmakers, on the other 
hand, traditionally use the examination of foreign legal rules and 
institutions to propose legal change and to induce the controlling elite of 
the receiving system to believe that the offered model meets their 
expectations. As a consequence, the development of the law takes place 
mainly by transplantation of legal rules.15 However, when legal 
parochialism is strong and jurisdictions are largely resistant to 
transplants (which is often the case in the western world, where 
jurisdictions are convinced of the efficiency of their own legal system),16 
transplanting elites usually deny the fact that a model is borrowed, and 
use local authority to bolster their opinion.17 Hence, legal change in the 
western world could be explained largely by ‘hidden’ transplants, which 
are a mixture of foreign and indigenous doctrines and principles.18 
 The upshot is that even if changes in the underlying social and 
economic conditions dictate an overhaul of the law, the reform process is 
subject to sources of path dependence that inhibit the emergence of 
modern and innovative legal rules and institutions. Moreover, domestic 
lawmakers cannot be expected to respond adequately to possible changes 
in the legal system of surrounding islands. However, this approach may 
well turn if an island jurisdiction legislature, facing global competition, 
rapid changes in technology and evolving market conditions, is 
                                                     
14 See Alchian (1950: 218-219). 
15 See La Porta et al. (1998: 1115). 
16 In transition economies, the influence of legal transplants may bring about broad 
statutory convergence across jurisdictions. Cf. Pistor (2000: 93) (‘[t]he high level of 
statutory legal convergence is largely the result of an external supply of legal solutions.’). 
17 Cf. Mattei (1994: 16) (noting that legal transplants can be very hidden phenomena). 
18 Cf. Hay et al. (1996: 566) (arguing that borrowing would be inefficient if foreign legal 
rules and institutions interfere with the existing business practice). 
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motivated to promote the competitiveness of indigenous industries by 
adopting favourable company law rules that reflect social and economic 
changes. Clearly, this could entail a more vibrant and competitive 
economy. The presence of market-driven pressures could force 
monopolistic legislatures to alter their company law regimes. Yet in the 
absence of an open market for trade in goods and services and free 
movement of the factors of production, it cannot be assumed that 
political actors and lawmakers generate a new lawmaking approach. But, 
if the island jurisdiction becomes part of a common market, like the 
United States or the European Union, and the national barriers to trade 
gradually dissipate, incentives to engage in competitive lawmaking could 
very well come to the surface. In the next section, the question is posed 
if, as the European Union becomes a more integrated economy, the 
jurisdictions will eventually change their lawmaking approach. 
 
2.2 The EU Era: Decentralized Federalism 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) between France, West Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg established the European 
common market. The Treaty provided for the right of establishment for 
foreign corporations to establish branches in another member state, 
without being subject to more restrictive company law provisions of the 
host state.19 At the time, the real seat theory, which provides that the 
laws of the host state are applied if the actual centre of the corporation’s 
activities has moved to the host state, was still dominant although many 
feared it was losing ground since the Netherlands had recently 
abandoned the doctrine. Furthermore, provision 293 (ex 220) of the 
Treaty,20 which invited the member states, for instance, to enter into 
negotiations regarding the 1968 Brussels Convention on the Mutual 
Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities, would have abandoned 
the real seat theory in favor of the incorporation doctrine.21 Recall that 
                                                     
19 See Leleux (1968); Buxbaum and Hopt (1988) (explaining that the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by the Treaty proscribes use of the real seat theory). 
20 The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the Treaty. 
21 Article 293 (ex 220) of the Treaty provides that ‘Member States shall, so far as 
necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefits 
of their nationals: 
 … 
‘the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 48 (ex 58), the retention of legal personality in the event of 
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the real seat doctrine was developed in opposition to the opportunistic 
conduct of island jurisdictions attempting to lure foot-loose firms at the 
expense of higher cost jurisdictions. Drawing on the concepts of 
evolutionary game theory, we see that, prior to the 20th century, Belgium 
played a non-cooperative game vis a vis France, which enabled French 
managers to change their state of incorporation. The threat of losing 
firms to foreign jurisdictions provided the impetus for the introduction of 
the real seat doctrine in Europe.22 
 In these circumstances, the Treaty would have arguably enhanced the 
introduction of a market for corporate charters for companies. The 
reaction to this was split. The founding member states, such as France 
and West Germany who feared the consequences of an outbreak of a so-
called ‘race-to-the-bottom’ reacted in the 1960s by binding existing 
members and new entrants to accept the harmonization of their company 
laws. More specifically, France was concerned that the Netherlands, 
which had a flexible company law code, would be able to attract a large 
number of pseudo-corporations.23 The EC’s preferred solution to this 
problem was the top-down harmonization of national company laws. 
Under this strategy, the member states entered into a cooperative game 
in which the parties agreed, in exchange for political benefits or rents, to 
desist from opportunism in exchange for membership in the 
Community.24 From this discussion, it should be clear that the small 
number of member states could negotiate and enforce a political 
agreement that protected their domestic national stock, which produced 
                                                                                                                      
their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between 
companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries.’ 
  
So far, there has been one attempt to meet the obligation of Article 293: the 1968 
Brussels Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities. As 
early as 1956, the Hague Conference on Private International Law drafted a treaty on the 
mutual recognition of the legal personality of companies. Both attempts failed. See 
Rammeloo (2001: 24-37) 
22 See Charny (1991: 428). 
23 The EC established, in 1960s, the first expert committee to analyze the effects of 
different capital income taxation policies of the member states. The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, which had an interest in developing their thriving capital markets, 
successfully impeded the harmonization of capital taxation to protect their successful 
policy of opening their borders. Cf. Holzinger (2003). 
24 See Timmermans (2003: 628). Political rather than economics rents were considered 
more valuable to member states given their concern for political stability and economic 
integration, Cf. Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 548). 
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both fiscal and political benefits for these governments. It should be 
clear that the combined effect of these benefits outweighed the value of 
the payoffs of competitive lawmaking. 
 During the 1970s a number of countries also entered the EU for 
similar reasons of political stability and economic integration. Even 
though the new entrants, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
endorsed the incorporation regime,25 which could easily have reinforced 
the possibility of the out-migration of domestic companies, the 
cooperative equilibrium was sufficiently stable to neutralize this 
tendency. The cooperative agreement also included another element. The 
member states would only agree to the harmonization of their national 
laws if this could be achieved without the alteration of the core 
components of company law.26 This confirms the expectation that 
member states would also respect each others lawmaking autonomy.  
 The first generation directives restated,27 in effect, the content of the 
member states’ national laws.28 Rigid and complete ‘top-down’ 
harmonization was high on the agenda. The mandatory rules, such as 
minimum capital requirements and disclosure rules, constituted part of 
the initial wave of harmonized rules.29 The array of mandatory legal 
capital rules, however, seemed to benefit domestic interest groups.30 
Incumbent management may have influenced the EU legislature to 
supply provisions that limit dividend payments and share repurchases so 
as to obtain more leeway to reinvest firm’s profits. Accountants, who 
                                                     
25 Under the incorporation regime, the company is not governed by the laws of the state 
of state where the actual center of the companies are, but by the laws of the state 
incorporation.  
26 See Charny (1991). 
27 See Villiers (1998: 28-51) (distinguish four generations of directives: the first 
generation emphasized uniformity and prescription; the second generation supplied a set 
of options which essentially represent the predominant approach in the member states; 
the third generation explicitly left issues to the member states; and the fourth generation 
took the process even further by adopting only a framework model). 
28 See Carney (1997: 318) (arguing that the first generation directives are likely to be 
representative of the dominant legal practices in the member states because their 
adoption required unanimous consent of the member states; Cheffins (1997: 448) (‘the 
EU has typically done little more than superimpose a series of measures on domestic 
regulations already in place’); Halbhuber (2001: 1406) (‘[t]he directives do not purport to 
deal with crucial issiues like fiduciary duties, exit, expulsion and redemption, transfer of 
shares etc.’). 
29 The first generation directives include the First and Second Directive. 
30 See Carney (1997: 324); Enriques and Macey (2001: 1202-1203). 
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play a pivotal role in the required valuation, also had a substantial 
interest in exerting influence on the legislative outcome. 
 With the introduction of England and other member states, the second 
wave of directives was arguably more flexible, granting states options to 
comply with the terms of the directives.31 Given the diversity of legal 
regimes, the optional approach ensured that the directives did not 
interfere with the core elements of member states national company law 
rules and hence respected the cooperative agreement.  
 The rigid approach of the first and second generation directives 
quickly showed its limitations. The harmonization of core areas of 
company law, like the structure and responsibility of the board of 
directors, cross-border mergers, representation of employees, and 
bankruptcy procedures, proved to be predictably slow and ineffective.32 
The fundamental disagreements among member states with regard to 
important issues, such as employee participation and the reluctance of 
member states to implement the harmonized rules,33 shows the difficulty 
with touching the autonomy of member state law. For instance, member 
states regularly vetoed directive proposals under Article 100 of the EC 
Treaty (now Article 94), unless a politically acceptable consensus would 
be achieved.34  
                                                     
31 The second generation directives include the Third and Sixth Directive on Mergers and 
Split-Offs, Fourth, Seventh and Eight Directives on Annual and Consolidated Accounts 
and the Qualification of Accountants. 
32 See Woolcock (1996: 292). In the words of the Commission (1985: 18): ‘relying on a 
strategy based totally on harmonization would be overregulatory, would take a long time 
to implement, would be inflexible and could stifle innovation.’ 
33 See Wouters (2000: 275). Germany’s reluctance to implement Council Directive 
(EEC) 90/605 of 8 November 1990, extending the Fourth and Seventh Directive to 
partnerships and limited partnerships with corporate general partners, perfectly 
exemplifies this trend. These hybrid business forms were not within the original scope of 
the Fourth and Seventh Directive. While some jurisdictions applied these Directives 
voluntarily to hybrid ‘limited liability vehicles’, like the Netherlands, the Commission 
took the view that it would run counter to the spirit and aims of the Fourth and Seventh 
Directive to allow these vehicles not to be subject to Community rules. The limited 
partnership with a corporate general partner (GmbH & Co KG) is particularly popular in 
Germany. Although the German government agreed on further extension of the directives 
after the European lawmakers announced further exemptions available to SMEs, it 
deferred implementing the amendment. Only after the ECJ’s judgment in Case C-272/97 
Commission v Germany the German government changed the law according to the 
amending directive. See Edwards (1999: 124). 
34 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 548) (describing the initial steps toward the economic 
union as decentralized federalism). 
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 It was clear early, given the legislative setbacks involving the first 
and second generation directives, that the European Commission would 
be unable to remove the most intractable barriers to economic 
integration. While the EU continued to pursue its harmonization strategy, 
policymakers within the Commission set out to design a more 
independent agenda on the basis of Article 308 (ex 235).35 To this end, 
the EC introduced the Regulation of the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG), which made it possible for firms from different 
member states to develop certain joint activities without having to merge 
or to set up a jointly owned subsidiary.36 The first genuine European 
business form came into existence because it was not detrimental to 
national doctrines and usages and hardly competed against national 
business forms.37 In reality, the EEIG’s restricted objectives and 
references to national law have resulted in a rather unpopular business 
form.38 
 In 1970 the Commission also proposed the introduction of the 
European Company. This legal business form was designed to allow 
firms, operating in two or more member states, the option to employ a 
genuine European business form, meaning that they will be able to move 
registered offices from one country to another without needing to 
dissolve the company in the first member state and to formally establish 
it in the second one. The strong resistance of member states to adopt the 
legislation, until recently, reflected their continued preference to retain 
legislative autonomy and control over core areas of company law. 
 Thus, the early phases of the harmonization process, with its root and 
branch approach, reached its inevitable terminus point with the failure of 
                                                     
35 Article 308 (ex 235) specifies two preconditions for unification: (1) action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain; (2) the powers provided in the Treaty are 
insufficient. See Buxbaum and Hopt (1988: 210-212). 
36 The EEIG is adopted in 1985 (Council Reg (EEC) 2137/85 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG) [1985] OJ L199/1). The EEIG creates a European legislative 
framework that provides existing firms with an easy and accessible vehicle for 
restructuring across frontiers.  
37 Cf. Grundmann (1999: 645 fn. 36).  
38 The EEIG is a mirror image of the French Groupement d’Interêt Economique, which 
has proved to be a popular business in the French business community. However, the 
Groupement d’Interêt Economique appears to owe its existence to limitation of the 
French partnership form. See Lutter (1996: 67) (arguing that from a German perspective, 
the promulgation of the EEIG is a mistake). See also Wouters (2000: 261). 
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the Fifth, Ninth and Thirteenth Directives, and a new direction was 
required to achieve the aims of European economic integration.39  
 
2.3 The EU-Era: Centralized Federalism 
After the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ case, and with the Commission’s 1985 White 
Paper as accepted in a Council Resolution of the same year, the EU tried 
to respond to calls for greater flexibility.40 Minimum harmonization and 
mutual recognition formed the so-called ‘new approach’ to 
harmonization.41 The following year, the Single European Act (SEA) 
attempted to resolve possible veto blockages at Council level by 
providing for a consultation procedure and qualified majority voting.42 
With the second enlargement,43 the EU adopted a new model of 
integration based on centralized federalism,44 which gave the European 
Commission increased agenda-setting power. Between 1986 and 1992, 
the EU adopted the two, third generation directives, concerning the 
disclosure of branches and formation of single member companies, 
which were marginal to domestic company law arrangements. 
 Despite greater flexibility under the ‘new approach’, standards 
imposed remain fairly high. Market regulation proves inadequate to 
market evolutions. Lacking solid foundations for legitimacy, the 
European Union remains a forum for member states eager to impose or 
defend their own legislative products, and hence their own regulatory 
policies and legal doctrines.45 EU ordering continues to be subject to 
                                                     
39 De Kluiver (1995: 300). 
40 See Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
[‘Cassis de Dijon’] [1979] ECR 1979; European Commission (1985).  
41 See Majone (1993a: 1-3) (‘[t]he immediate reason for introducing this new strategy 
was to reduce the burden on the Commission in harmonizing national rules.’). 
42 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 549) (‘[b]orn in part from the frustration over the 
slow pace of integration of the advantages such reforms might have in combating 
Europe’s declining economic fortunes (known as ‘Eurosclerosis’), the ten members of 
the Community put aside the Luxembourg Compromise and decentralized federalism and 
adopted in 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) and a new institutional structure closely 
approximating that of centralized federalism.’). Cf. Streit and Mussler (1998: 104-105). 
43 In 1986, Spain, Portugal and Greece entered the EU. 
44 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 549). 
45 See Heritier (1996: 149). Cf. Caruso (1997) (arguing that entrenched in legal 
formalism, obstinate in the defence of the doctrinal coherence of their codes and 
unwilling to discuss the political merits of their consolidated policies, European legal 
actors manage to slow down, and even at times to halt, the process of private law 
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consensus, and to compromise lawmaking.46 Fragmentation and the lack 
of a general concept on the part of Brussels may be suggested as a best 
case scenario. The harmonization process cannot be explained on 
efficiency grounds only, but should be viewed as a response to pressures 
from several interest groups wanting to protect the existing legal 
framework and frustrate competitive lawmaking.47 
 
2.4 The EU-Era: Democratic Federalism 
A new stage in the evolution of federalism was characterized by the 
development of the subsidiarity principle, which member states 
embraced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union.48 With 
regard to areas that are not of the exclusive competence of the European 
Union,49 the subsidiarity principle embodied in Article 5 of the Treaty 
commands the decision to locate competence at EU level or at member 
state level. Rather than listing the competencies of the Union and 
member states, the subsidiarity principle provides for an efficiency test 
to determine competencies and, more crucially, to constrain the 
Commission’s executive power.50 Recently, though, the Commission 
                                                                                                                      
integration); Halbhuber (2001: 1409-1411) (arguing that domestic doctrinal structures 
appear to play an important role in shaping the German understanding of European 
company law materials). 
46 See Scharpf (1999). 
47 See Carney (1997: 317 and 329). 
48 Besides constraining the Commission’s role through the subsidiarity principle, the 
Maastricht Treaty also introduced the co-decision procedure. As a consequence, the 
European Union’s decision-making structure closely resembles the constitutional form of 
democratic federalism in which central government policies are agreed to by a simple 
majority of elected representatives from lower-tier governments. See Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1997: 50-53); (1998: 550). 
49 Areas within the exclusive competence of the Union are subject to the proportionality 
test. Article 5 §3 of the Treaty provides that ‘any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve objectives of the Treaty’. 
50 First of all, it has to be determined whether there is a power under the Treaty to take 
action. The subsidiarity principle then determines whether and how the Community may 
act. It must be shown that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states. The finding must then justify the further conclusion that 
in view of the measure the objective can be better achieved at Community level. 
Eventually, the proportionality test as defined in §3 of Article 5 has to be satisfied. See 
Micklitz and Weatherill (1997: 16). See also Bermann (1994: 334) (‘[t]he drafters’ 
apparent purpose was to reassure Member State populations, and subcommunities within 
those populations, the Community’s seemingly inexorable march toward greater legal 
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responded by proposing a new approach in governance and regulation at 
EU level that would reinforce the principle of subsidiarity, but at the 
same time strengthen the role of the European Commission as a political 
driving force.51  
 The European Commission, building on the principle of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, has introduced a new type of directive, based on 
general principles. Despite the further flexibilization of directives 
(moving from the provision of certain minimum standards to a 
framework model for directives), promulgating directives remained 
much like running the gauntlet.52 For instance, the collapse in 2001 of 
the Thirteenth Directive, on takeovers, exemplifies the deeply rooted 
conflict between some member states over the direction and pace of the 
directives.53  
 At the national level, there are noticeably few incentives for 
lawmakers to modify regulatory design or reform inefficient rules 
because of legislative inertia and special interest.54 Very generally, the 
differences in the normative arrangements between the continental and 
common law systems partly explain the deeply rooted conflict between 
the member states over the direction and pace of the harmonization 
program. These insights provide key clues as to why only a relatively 
small number of EU-level initiatives have been heralded as major 
breakthroughs in the field of company. 
 Recently, after more than thirty years of negotiation and bickering, 
the member states reached agreement on yet another truly genuine 
European business form: the European Company (Societas Europea, or 
SE). The SE statute, which is due to enter into force in October 2004, 
gives firms operating in two or more member states the option to form a 
                                                                                                                      
and political integration would not needlessly trample their legitimate claims to 
democratic self-governance and cultural diversity.’).  
51 See European Commission (2001b). See Cygan (2002: 240) (‘[t]he main criticism 
against the contents of the White Paper is that it promotes the institutional self-interest of 
the Commission, at the expense of substantive concerns of many EU citizens.’). 
52 See Deakin (2001: 192-195). 
53 Cf. Forstinger (2002: 34). 
54 Powerful insiders that derive private benefits from blockholding arrangements and 
non-stakeholder interests have few incentives to optimize national corporate governance 
regimes for the benefit of shareholders. See, e.g., Roe (2001) (noting that as nations with 
norms and corporate rules that harm shareholders become more competitive through 
customs unions and single-currency areas, pressure on these norms, these corporate law 
and labour law rules, and old politics rises, as it has been doing). 
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European company. According to this view, a menu of European 
business forms could create a legal framework that helps firms to set up 
and develop at a European level, to create an economic environment 
through which firms can reach their full development in the internal 
market, and, more crucially, to promote cooperation between firms 
located in different regions of the European Union.55 
 Nevertheless, most European lawyers have expressed skepticism 
about whether the new law will lead to significant changes in corporate 
practice. For example, the proposed statute excludes a large number of 
areas relevant to businesses operating in two states, all of which continue 
to be governed by national legislation.56 Moreover, the failure of the 
European Statute to address the problem of taxation will clearly 
undermine the number of firms incorporating as European companies. 
Indeed, the compromise agreed by ministers after more than 30 years 
received the unenthusiastic endorsement of the European Parliament, 
although its disapproval would not have made any difference – but 
importantly it neutralized the threat of federal intervention in national 
company law, thereby reinforcing the cooperative arrangements between 
member states. 
The latest efforts of the EC to create a modern regulatory framework 
for corporate law are largely inspired by recommendations made by a 
group of experts commissioned by the EU. The reform measures are 
designed to simplify existing rules and improve freedom of choice 
between alternative forms of organization. The reform efforts will be 
carried forward at four levels. First, it proposes to modernize company 
law by further attempting to harmonize corporate disclosure, board 
structure and director liability requirements, and by amending capital 
rules.57 Second, it plans to adopt rules facilitating corporate restructuring 
                                                     
55 In the words of Frits Bolkestein, Commissioner for EU internal market affairs, the SE 
will boost Europe’s competitiveness. See European Commission (2001). 
56 See Springael (2002) (arguing that the European Company is not a uniform company 
type, as originally intended, but instead a ‘national European Company’); Hampton 
(2002: 1) (arguing that without an EU-wide regime for tax, freedom of movement 
between countries and a single corporate form, it offers little that cannot be achieved 
already). 
57 The simplification of the Second (and First) Company Law Directive is part of the 
fourth phase of the Simpler Legislation for the Single Market (SLIM) initiative. In this 
respect, the Company Law SLIM Working Group has reconsidered contribution in kind, 
nominal value, withdrawal of shares, acquisition of own shares, financial assistance and 
pre-emptive rights. However, the SLIM Working Group did not enter into the theoretical 
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and mobility. Third, the Commission proposes the establishment of a 
permanent coordination structure, the European Corporate Governance 
Forum, and of (Member State) agencies to sanction unfit directors. 
Fourth, it proposes to strengthen the supervision of auditors and to adopt 
comprehensive rules on the conduct of audits. It should be easy to see 
that the new direction largely retraces the earlier terrain covered by 
previous attempts of the EC to harmonize company law rules and 
therefore we should not be too optimistic about its prospects for success. 
 The next section analyzes the stable character of the US system of 
charter competition, and then moves on to discuss the various 
institutional structures in Europe that could give rise to competitive 
lawmaking in the field of company law. We discuss the recent decisions 
of the European Court of Justice in Centros, Überseering and Inspire 
Art,58 which could eventually trigger the development of competitive 
lawmaking and thereby threaten the stable equilibrium in EU company 
law. 
 
3. COMPETITIVE LAWMAKING IN THE EU 
Even though the dynamics of European company law have not changed 
fundamentally in more than thirty years, recent developments in EU case 
law could eventually undermine the stable equilibrium and set the stage 
for member states engaging in competitive lawmaking by offering 
modernized company law. The case for a more explicit consideration of 
competitive lawmaking is further reinforced by the introduction of the 
subsidiarity principle, which has strengthened the conviction that 
national lawmakers are better suited to develop legal rules and 
                                                                                                                      
discussion about whether the legal capital requirement should be maintained. See 
Wymeersch (2000b). The High Level Group of Company Law Experts has added two 
more approaches to the reform of legal capital in Europe: the US approach and a new 
European approach, which is based on the capital maintenance rules of several 
jurisdictions. Both new systems entail elimination of legal capital. See High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts (2002b: 24-25). In its final report (High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts (2002c: 78-93)), the High Level Group stated that the capital 
maintenance regime laid down in the second company law directive should be simplified 
along the lines proposed by the SLIM working group. Moreover, it suggested that the 
European Commission should review the feasibility of an alternative to the capital 
formation and maintenance rules on the basis of solvency tests. 
58 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstryelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; Case 
C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement GmbH; Case C-
167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd. 
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institutions.59 In this respect, European policymakers may be forced to 
use regulatory competition as a strategy to create an environment that 
helps SMEs to reach their full development in the European market. In 
addition, the introduction of a single currency in Europe and the 
development of Europe’s high-growth stock markets may act as a 
catalyst for competitive lawmaking. Of course, these developments will 
not change the equilibrium overnight, but they may well cause a shift in 
the balance of political power away from those who favour lawmaking 
autonomy towards those who look at the US experience and wish to 
stimulate regulatory competition.  
 It should be noted that, as Europe enters the competitive lawmaking 
environment, lawmakers will mainly focus on the needs of business 
firms that are most likely to engage in forum shopping. Since the 
Directives regarding publicly held corporations have reduced the 
feasibility of competition in the context of large corporations, European 
lawmakers will begin to turn their attention to holding companies and 
closely held firms, such as joint ventures. This section discusses the 
potential effect of the competition among national rules on the evolution 
of company law rules in Europe. We consider moreover the incentives of 
states to respond quickly to the competition by adopting efficient 
legislation that meets business needs and assess whether a ‘European 
Delaware’ is likely to play a leading role in stimulating regulatory 
competition and experimentation in business statutes. 
3.1 US Experience 
In the context of company law, regulatory competition has been well 
publicized in the US.60 Since this discussion is likely to become 
increasingly relevant to the EU, it is worth providing a brief summary of 
the literature here.  
 The US legal system traditionally views company law in general as a 
local matter reserved to the states’ governments.61
 
Consequently, the 
                                                     
59 Cf. Charny (1991: 440-441) (arguing that decentralization facilitates adaptation to 
local conditions). 
60 Corporate law has served as an adequate test field of the models developed by public 
sector economists. See, e.g., Bebchuk (1995); Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999); Cary (1974); 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991); Fischel (1982); Romano (1985); Romano (1993); Winter 
(1977). 
61 See Bebchuk (1995: 1438) (noting that even though federal law governs some 
important issues, including insider trading, disclosure and the making of tender offers, 
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corporation statutes of some states may differ appreciably from those of 
most other states on many critical matters. Once US business owners 
decide to incorporate, they must select an attractive state of 
incorporation. Under traditional conflict-of-law rules,62 courts will 
respect this choice even if the corporation in question has no other 
contact with the chosen state. The corporate laws of the incorporating 
state govern the basic rights and duties of a corporation and its 
participants.  
 At the end of the 19th century, New Jersey and Delaware, concerned 
about incorporation decisions, adopted modernized general incorporation 
statutes.63 Eventually, Delaware’s statute made it the leading 
incorporation state in the United States since the 1920s,64 presently 
serving as the state of incorporation for nearly half of the corporations 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and more than half of all 
Fortune 500 firms.65 In addition, Delaware is also the leading destination 
for firms that opt to reincorporate. Clearly, Delaware’s value to 
incorporating firms is more than an up-to-date statute. The possibility of 
other states rapidly free-riding on the efforts and resources of the 
Delaware legislature by copying its statute would entail Delaware’s lead 
being exhausted in a very short period of time.66 For instance, the less 
easily replicated judicial expertise and other enduring advantages, such 
as a well-developed corporate case law, learning and network benefits, 
herd behaviour,67 and the superiority of Delaware’s specialized chancery 
court, arguably preserve Delaware’s leading position over time.68  
                                                                                                                      
much of the law regulating a corporation’s affairs stems from its state of incorporation). 
See Leleux (1968) (comparing the European and the US situation). 
62 See supra footnotes [2]. 
63 With its 1888 corporation statute and the 1896 revision, New Jersey was the first state 
to enter the competition. Delaware joined New Jersey in 1899. 
64 See, e.g., Bebchuk (1995: 1443) (‘[a]fter restrictive amendments to its corporation law 
were made in 1913, New Jersey lost the leading role to Delaware, whose corporation law 
was at the time a close copy of New Jersey’s original statute.’). 
65 See Romano (1993: 6-12). See also Fisch (2000: 1061) (‘incorporations bring 
Delaware approximately $440 million per year in franchise taxes and related fees.’). 
66 One should distinguish this process from legal transplantation, emulation or imitation. 
The latter occurs when laws are changed in the absence of pressures on the legislature in 
economic and political markets. See Sun and Pelkmans (1995); Woolcock (1996: 297-
298). 
67 See Coffee (1999: 703) (arguing that corporations may prefer to locate in a popular 
jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the 
inherent superiority of its law). ‘Herd behavior loosely refers to a situation in which 
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 Delaware’s corporate law plays a key role in the evolution of 
companies in the United States, because Delaware law provides an 
alternative set of rules which serve firms and their legal advisers across 
the country. Consequently, many commentators have dealt with the 
vexed question of whether the choice of Delaware’s corporate law 
eventually leads to value maximization. In other words, is regulatory 
competition better described as a ‘race to the bottom’ or as a ‘race to the 
top’? 
 Some commentators continue to point to possible shortcomings of the 
competitive process that ensue from the divergence between the interests 
of managers and public shareholders.69 In their view, the development of 
state anti-takeover legislation perfectly exemplifies the shortcomings of 
regulatory competition. Because of the ability of firms’ management to 
capture state legislation, states (including Delaware) have developed 
anti-takeover statutes and judicial decisions permitting the use of 
defensive tactics that are overly protective of incumbent managers at the 
expense of shareholders.70 If the possibility of shareholder exit by tender 
to a hostile offeror is severely threatened, market mechanisms cannot 
adequately align the interests of managers and shareholders. By 
providing a constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the 
takeover market creates a powerful incentive for managers to restrain 
from managerial self-dealing. Assuming that the ‘market-for-corporate-
control’ is economically efficient in that it increases firm value, 
regulatory competition has serious implications for the race-to-the-top 
thesis. Consequently, according to this argument, mandatory federal 
rules should at least ensure that the market for corporate control remains 
active, robust, and competitive.71  
 It is doubtful, however, that US company laws will be placed under 
federal jurisdiction in the near future. Although it is conventional 
wisdom among US scholars that regulatory competition produces a race-
                                                                                                                      
people imitate the actions of others and in so doing ignore, to some extent, their own 
information and judgments regarding the merits of their decisions.’ See Kahan and 
Klausner 1996: 355). 
68 See, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: 212-213); Fisch (2000: 1063); Kahan and 
Kamar (2001: 1212-1214); Romano (1985); Romano (1998: 365). 
69 See Bebchuk (1992); Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
70 See Bratton and McCahery (1995: 1887–1889). 
71 See Bebchuk (1992); Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999). 
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to-the-top with respect to some areas of corporate law,72 it certainly has 
its flaws. First, states do not pursue regulatory competition solely by 
offering rules that meet their clients’ needs. High-powered interest 
groups within a particular state induce the competitive process because 
of considerable tangible benefits. It has been argued that Delaware’s 
corporation law is devised to maximize the amount of work performed 
by lawyers who are members of the Delaware Bar.73 By providing 
standards and ambiguous default rules rather than rules that are clear in 
application, Delaware law enhances the amount of litigation in the 
state.74 Delaware lawmakers thereby respond to the lobbying efforts of 
in-state lawyers who are able to capture a considerable share of the 
incorporating revenues, due to litigation-increasing standards. 
 Furthermore, since Delaware can rely on its dominant position in the 
market for incorporations, it could allow itself to prevent the emergence 
of optimal legal rules that would prevail in a perfectly competitive 
market.75 Finally, recent empirical research indicates that regulatory 
competition in the context of corporate law is imperfect as not only the 
product quality, but also the location of the ‘seller’ plays a pivotal role. It 
appears that since firms display a marked home preference with respect 
to company law rules, states are more successful in retaining in-state 
firms than attracting out-of-state business formations.76  
 Thus, Delaware closely resembles a monopolistic ‘seller’ possessing 
market power and competitive advantages that other jurisdictions cannot 
replicate.77 The increasing return mechanisms act as substantial barriers 
to other states wishing to enter the market for out-of-state business 
formations. Since the radical change in company lawmaking in the late 
19th century, the Delaware-equilibrium has ruled. Delaware has played 
and still plays a pivotal role as the national lawmaker in the US, 
protecting itself from other states and federal interference by responding 
to interest group pressures. It follows from this discussion that regulatory 
competition may not automatically yield an efficient outcome. Its legal 
                                                     
72 See Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999: 1171). 
73 See Macey and Miller (1987: 491–498). 
74 See Bratton and McCahery (1995: 1887–1888); Kahan and Kamar (2001: 
1217). 
75 See Kahan and Kamar (2001: 1252). 
76 See Bebchuk and Cohen (2001). 
77 See Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002). 
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product, however, is arguably superior to what a centralized regime 
would produce.78 
 
3.2 The Entrance of a New EU Era? 
From the 1999 onwards, a number of law and economics scholars have 
interpreted the ECJ’s rulings involving the freedom of establishment of 
foreign corporations and the mutual recognition of companies by the 
member states as providing the demise of the real seat doctrine. This 
approach suggests that the improvement of corporate mobility, achieved 
by the ECJ in case law in Centros and its progeny of cases, provides the 
basis for the development of a market for incorporations in the EU.  
 In an important sense, a competitive environment for legal rules has 
yet to fully develop due to the real seat doctrine that governs in most 
member states. In recent years, however, the combination of new 
decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the legislative 
blockage in the company law harmonization program has stimulated 
considerable interest in the competition between jurisdictions. While the 
real seat doctrine continues to restrict firm mobility, the ECJ’s recent 
judgments in Centros, Überseeing and Inspire Art may, in the near term, 
encourage the introduction of competitive lawmaking within the 
European Union. Member states may gain by competing to supply 
flexible company forms for closely held businesses.  
 In fact, some of this sort of competition is stimulated by cross-border 
tax competition.79 Consequently, there are adequate incentives for 
governments to create better company law vehicles. Thus, a crucial 
debate in Europe is whether a market for corporate legal rules will 
ultimately emerge within the European Union, and if so, whether it will 
be based on a Delaware-like model in which firms can freely select their 
country of incorporation.80 In the face of mounting economic pressure to 
reduce existing levels of regulation, the virtual absence of any 
lawmaking behaviour that arguably resembles the charter competition in 
                                                     
78 See Bratton and McCahery (2004). 
79 See Carney (1997: 327); Code of Conduct Group, Report form the Code of Conduct 
Group on Business Taxation to Ecofin Council, 29 November 1999. 
80 See, e.g., Ebke (2000: 625-628) (explaining that competitive lawmaking has become a 
dominant theme in European company law); Cheffins (1997: 421-451) (explaining the 
potential role of the market for incorporations in deepening European economic 
integration). 
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the United States suggests that there are substantive legal and procedural 
barriers to the establishment of jurisdictional competition in the 
European Union.81 Moreover, critics suggest that competition based on 
considerations of company law rules will only play a marginal role in 
Europe. Firms (and their participants) that stand to decide where to 
organize their business would set a higher value on the tax rates they 
have to pay on capital income than on available legal rules.82 From the 
perspective of the jurisdictional competition paradigm, it is therefore 
more likely that innovative jurisdictions attempt to attract firms and 
capital by lowering their tax rates. Ireland and the Netherlands present 
famous cases of successfully capitalizing on the tax preferences of 
European and non-European business firms.83  
 Under the influence of competitive market pressures, a number of 
member states could be driven to institute reforms to their tax regimes 
and company law legislation not only to stem the flow of firms migrating 
to other countries, but also to gain a reputation for being a competitive 
jurisdiction which satisfies the needs of a range of firms. In fact, the 
incentive effect of regulatory arbitrage is also present without firm 
mobility when firms can observe government performance across 
jurisdictions and can sanction political actors whose performance is 
inferior to that of other jurisdictions.84  
 Although jurisdictional competition in Europe is still a remote 
possibility, the empirical evidence lends support to the view that an 
outbreak in competition for incorporations is not probable unless large 
incentives for lawmakers materialize. However, it might be argued that 
we can already foresee a pattern of regulatory competition in the context 
                                                     
81 See Scharpf (1999: 101-103). 
82 See Wymeersch (2000) (arguing that competition is taking place on the basis of 
differences in tax laws, labour laws and environmental laws in Europe; business forms 
are not an essential component of regulatory competition). Cf. Ferran (2001) (noting that 
limited evidence considered in the context of the UK’s company law review supports the 
view that fiscal, operational and macro-economic considerations rather than company 
law are the major considerations in the decision whether or not to locate a business in a 
given country). 
83 See Bratton and McCahery (2001: 701). 
84 Cf. Breton and Ursprung (2002: 4). Thus seen, large firms that made irreversible 
investments and therefore cannot threaten to move their seat to another jurisdiction 
could conceivably join other interests in a lobbying process. See also Bratton and 
McCahery (1997: 256-259) (discussing ‘yardstick competition models’ that attempt to 
ameliorate the Tiebout model’s shortcomings by substituting the vote for mobility as the 
competitive mechanism). 
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of closely held and holding companies. But this market, for the most 
part, is an effect of tax-induced regulations rather than company law. 
Against this background, this section will assess the implications of these 
cases to determine whether the ECJ’s decisions point toward the 
eventual introduction of a new era in lawmaking.  
 In the context of company law, the ECJ’s ruling provides two 
important elements of regulatory competition: mutual recognition and 
minimum standards.85 Certainly, the ECJ did not explicitly rule the real 
seat doctrine contrary to community law.86 The ECJ focused solely on 
the (secondary) establishment of a branch by an English private 
company in Denmark,87 thereby explicitly refraining from contradicting 
the Daily Mail case and the 1997 proposal for a Fourteenth Directive 
dealing with the transfer of a firm’s registered office or de facto head 
office.88 In the Daily Mail case, the ECJ ruled that the right to transfer a 
firm’s real seat to a member state other than where it incorporated is not 
protected by Article 43 (ex 52) of the Treaty.89 It restricted firms’ rights 
of primary establishment, on the grounds that no agreement on the 
mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of Article 
293 (ex 220) had been reached, and hence denied the opportunity for 
firms to choose a favoured company law regime.90  
                                                     
85 Thus seen, the Centros case is a further variation on the theme of the Cassis de Dijon 
case. See Bratton et al. (1996: 31-32); Streit and Mussler (1998: 102-103); Woolcock 
(1996: 294). Centros goes beyond Cassis de Dijon by applying a test of market access, 
according to which all goods and persons should have substantive access to other 
member states’ markets irrespective of any form of discrimination. See Barnard and 
Deakin (2001: 18). 
86 See Ribstein (2001: 820) (arguing that Centros invites erosion of the real seat 
doctrine). However, many commentators have a different view, in ‘their desire to 
advance the law and giving expression to deeply felt convictions as to what the freedom 
of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty should entail’. See Ebke 
(2000: 629); Xanthaki (2000: 2). 
87 The secondary establishment alludes to the setting up of agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries. If Centros had dealt directly with the primary establishment – a firm’s right 
to establish itself in a member state by transferring its real seat – the Danish Trade and 
Companies Board would have questioned the existence or the legal status of Centros Ltd. 
As Denmark follows the theory of incorporation, the legal status was naturally beyond 
dispute in Danish courts. Cf. Ebke (2000: 631 and 636); Rammeloo (2001: 65-85). 
88 Case 81/87 The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex p. 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483. See Edwards (1999: 376-383). 
89 In Daily Mail, the ECJ held that member states may impose ‘exit’ taxes on firms that 
wish to reincorporate, that is they may treat reincorporation as a ‘liquidation’. 
90 See Daily Mail (§21-25). 
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 The proposal of the Fourteenth Directive intends to reconcile the real 
seat and incorporation doctrines by providing that member states shall 
take all measures necessary to allow firms to transfer their registered 
office or de facto head office, together or separately, to another member 
state.91 According to Article 3 of the proposal, such a transfer involves a 
change in the law applicable to the firm.92 The draft proposal 
understandably refrains from eliminating the real seat doctrine. The 
majority of member states use this doctrine to protect existing regulatory 
regimes, which in various instances represent a capital asset of that state 
or regulate a controversial issue.93 Germany’s system of labour 
representation (unternehmerische Mitbestimmung or co-determination) 
on the supervisory board of large corporations is a marvellous example 
of such a capital investment in regulation. If the European Union 
chooses to federalize choice-of-law legislation, it may very well lose 
more political support than it would gain from interfering. Moreover, 
drafting a proposal that lacks the member states’ support is clearly quite 
futile. 
 By expanding the scope of the term ‘branch’, however, the ECJ has 
reduced the difference between primary and secondary establishment to 
a minimum, thereby accepting the principle of mutual recognition in the 
context of company law.94 In fact, the English corporation transferred its 
                                                     
91 For instance, a firm that initially incorporated in a real seat jurisdiction has to move 
both its registered and central administration. See Drury (1999: 362-371). 
92 The High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002b: 33-34) argues that the 
change of the governing law is in many cases unnecessary and produces anomalies.  
93 Macey (1990) identifies ‘three situations in which federal lawmakers will maximize 
political support for themselves by relegating authority to state officials. The first is 
where existing state law has created expropriable quasi-rents through the development of 
asset-specific investment whose continued value depends on the perpetuation of such 
laws. The second is when a single national rule, permitting new entry, would deprive 
local interest groups of the advantage of an existing spatial monopoly. Finally, we have 
seen that federal lawmakers, who often must act under conditions of uncertainty, 
sometimes will wish to avoid the political fallout that accompanies particularly 
controversial decisions.’ 
94 See Ebke (2000: 633-637, 660) (noting that in the Centros case, the ECJ may have 
expanded the scope of the term ‘branch’ within the meaning of Article 43(1) of the 
Treaty). The ECJ held that:  
 ‘It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the EC Treaty for a Member State to refuse to 
register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member 
State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business where the 
branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in the 
State in which the branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company 
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seat to Denmark.95 The ECJ recognized the right of a Danish firm to 
incorporate in the United Kingdom without the intention of conducting 
business operations in the state of incorporation. In this way, Centros 
renewed the discussion about regulatory arbitrage in Europe.96 Thus 
seen, the case is a forerunner of a new approach to the evolution of 
company law and will predictably yield some tangible results in this 
field.97 It already shows that firms can migrate to countries that offer 
internal processes and legal regimes that lower their costs regardless of 
where the firm’s assets, employees and investors are located.98  
 Centros also dealt with a necessary precondition for mutual 
recognition, which at the same time is viewed by European 
commentators as the second key element of regulatory competition, i.e., 
minimum essential requirements.99 Experience within the European 
Union suggests that due to a lack of mutual trust, the principle of mutual 
recognition may only work if there is agreement on minimum standards 
to protect the general interest of the stakeholders.100 In this respect, it is 
submitted that the ECJ is an active participant in European regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formalities of companies 
which, in that State, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum share 
capital.’ 
95 See Wymeersch (2000a) (suggesting that if a member state cannot deny access to a 
corporation formed in accordance with the law of another member state, it is difficult to 
explain why a member state could prevent such an incorporated firm from establishing 
itself in the other member state); Xanthaki (2000: 7) (arguing that in the light of the 
Centros intention to circumvent Danish corporation law, the ECJ’s decision is unfair, 
albeit basically legal). 
96 Regulatory arbitrage ‘is the action taken by market operators in selecting the best 
location for investment or economic activity depending on the local regulatory 
environment’. See Woolcock (1996: 298). 
97 Cf. Gilson (2001: 353) (arguing that from the perspective of an American, a narrow 
interpretation of Centros seems like wishful thinking).  
98 For instance, in Centros the ECJ permitted a Danish firm to incorporate in the United 
Kingdom so as to circumvent cumbersome Danish corporation law rules, especially those 
on minimum capital. This trend is far from new. In Segers (case 79/85 Segers v 
Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen 
[1986] ECR 2375), the court already decided that under Article 43 (ex 52) a Dutch sole 
proprietor could incorporate in England, because setting up a Dutch close corporation 
took considerably longer – even if he intended to continue to operate wholly in the 
Netherlands. 
99 See Majone (1993); Sun and Pelkmans (1994); Woolcock (1996: 305).  
100 See infra footnotes 84-107 and accompanying text. Cf. Gatsios and Holmes (1998: 
273) (noting that repeated attempts to introduce mutual recognition of the registration of 
new drugs failed because there is a lack of mutual trust regarding such procedures). 
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policy in the sense that it can determine that the minimum standards in 
one member state are equivalent to those of another.101 If a member state 
maintains higher standards, these measures must be proportional and 
non-discriminatory.102 In Centros, the ECJ decided that it is contrary to 
the Treaty for Denmark to refuse to register a branch of a firm organized 
as a close corporation in the United Kingdom solely to evade the 
application of the minimum capital requirements. Apparently, minimum 
capital requirements are not essential requirements to protect the 
interests of creditors of closely held firms.103 The court found that such 
creditors are protected by the disclosure requirements applicable to close 
corporations on the ground of the Fourth and Eleventh Directives on 
annual and consolidated accounts.104 The ECJ argued furthermore that 
that it is possible to adopt measures that are less restrictive and interfere 
less in fundamental freedoms. In addition, the ECJ noted that the Danish 
authorities were not precluded from entering into an agreement with the 
British authorities to overcome potential efficiencies from a British firm 
doing business in Denmark only. 
 Even though regulatory competition may not be the aim of the ECJ’s 
intervention, the above analysis shows that Centros could very well 
usher in a new era of competitive lawmaking with regard to company 
law in Europe. Of course, commentators may take refuge behind a 
phalanx of obscure and convoluted statements in the ECJ’s decision in 
                                                     
101 See Woolcock (1996: 294). 
102 See Centros §§31-38. 
103 Most European member states view minimum capital as essential to obtaining limited 
liability protection. However, these minimum capital requirements do not pass the four-
factor test. See Centros §34: ‘it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s 
case law, national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of 
the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order 
to attain it.’ 
104 The ECJ seems to follow the Second Directive on the formation of publicly held 
corporations and the maintenance and alteration of their capital. See Centros §36. For a 
short comment on the efficiency of capital maintenance rules. But see Rammeloo (2001: 
78-79) (‘[t]he precondition that “national measures must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest” was not followed by any overall conclusion that 
capital requirements as such are not suited to protect company creditors.’). 
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order to defend the real seat doctrine.105 That said, the conclusion that 
Centros stimulates regulatory competition, in the case of secondary 
establishments and new companies, is in line with the policy laid down 
by the European Commission in the 1985 White Paper on Completing 
the Internal Market. This new approach to lawmaking aims to limit 
harmonization efforts to the essential minimum, and provides for mutual 
recognition of national regulations.106  
 It is only to be expected that the ECJ will continue along the path it 
set about developing in Centros. The Centros decision constitutes an 
initial step in the evolution of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on freedom of 
establishment and mutual recognition of companies in Europe.107 Indeed 
the Überseering judgment should be considered an extension of Centros, 
as this ruling represents the view of the ECJ that companies enjoy 
freedom of establishment and mutual recognition based on Articles 43 
and 48 of the Treaty. In Überseering, the ECJ rejected the German 
principles of case law, under which the Dutch corporation was denied 
legal entity status and the corresponding right to file an action, against a 
company for breach of contract, in a German court.108 The Court’s 
decision in Überseering has been extensively studied by other scholars 
and will require only brief summary here.109 The ECJ held that where a 
firm incorporated in accordance with the law of a member state (A) in 
which it has its registered office, is deemed, under the law of another 
member state (B), to have moved its actual centre of administration to 
member state B, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude member state B 
from denying the legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to bring 
                                                     
105 See Halbhuber (2001: 1409) (‘German authors exhibited a certain bias in reading 
judgments of the ECJ. They failed to see the contradiction between the Court’s reasoning 
in Segers and German Sitztheorie practice, and misread a confirmation of Sitztheorie into 
Daily Mail, which dealt only with restrictions imposed by the member state of 
incorporation.’). 
106 See Gatsion and Holmes (1998: 272); Woolcock (1996: 289-290). 
107 See Hathaway (2001: 645-650) (referring to the phenomenon of ‘sequencing path 
dependence’ in judicial lawmaking); Stone Sweet and McCown (2001: 7) (‘[i]n any 
specific legal domain, judicial rulings on cases that come first will exert influence on 
subsequent litigation and judicial decisionmaking.’). 
108 It is argued that the action was unnecessary because, under German law, the Dutch BV 
should have been treated as a German commercial partnership, which can bring an action 
in a German court. See Ebke (2000: 653-654). 
109 See, e.g., Roth (2003); Heine (2003); and (Lombardo (2003). 
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legal proceedings before its national courts for the purpose of enforcing 
rights under a contract with a firm established in member state B.  
 The ECJ initially distinguished its Daily Mail judgment and 
Überseering, differentiating between the freedom of movement 
concerning immigration of companies, in which case member states 
cannot impose any additional requirements, and emigration where the 
national legislator has wide discretion. According to the Überseering 
Court, companies are best understood as ‘creatures of national legal 
orders’.110 Thus, if a company is validly formed under the national laws 
of one member state, another member state must accept this. The ECJ 
thereby effectively rejected the application of the real seat doctrine when 
it ruled that Überseering had the legal capacity in Germany despite being 
incorporated in the Netherlands, and its shareholders living in Germany.
 The ECJ’s recent judgment in Inspire Art constitutes yet another 
landmark ruling in the field of the freedom of establishment. This case 
involved a private limited company established under English law with 
its statutory seat in Folkestone. Its sole shareholder and director, 
however, had his domicile in the Netherlands and no business was 
conducted in the UK. Apparently the company was established under 
English law in order to avoid the stringent rules of Dutch company law. 
A branch of the company was registered in the Handelregister of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam. But, Inspire Art refused to 
register as a pseudo-foreign company and therefore did not comply with 
one of the obligations under Dutch law imposed on foreign companies. 
The Chamber of Commerce brought this as a test case before the 
Kantonrechter in Amsterdam, claiming Inspire Art had violated Dutch 
law. It petitioned the Kantonrechter to order Inspire Art to complete its 
registration to the effect that Inspire Art is a pseudo-foreign company 
and therefore required to comply with the minimum capital 
requirements. The Kantongerecht submitted two questions to the ECJ: 
(1) whether Articles 43 and 48 are to be seen as precluding The 
Netherlands from setting additional demands such as those found in 
Articles 2-5 of the Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen 
(WFBV-Dutch law on pseudo-foreign companies); (2) if the provisions in 
the WFBV are found to be incompatible with European law, must Article 
46 be interpreted in such a way that Articles 43 and 48 do not preclude 
                                                     
110 Paragraph 40 of the Überseering decision. 
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The Netherlands from applying rules such as those setforth in the 
WFBV, on grounds of creditor protection? 
 The ECJ held that Article 1 of the WFBV, which required Inspire Art 
to register under as a pseudo-foreign company, was contrary to Article 2 
of the Eleventh Council Directive because it does not allow any 
disclosure requirement not provided for by the directive. In terms of the 
second issue before the ECJ, the Court referred to its earlier judgment 
and ruled that it was immaterial for the applicability of the freedom of 
establishment that a company, established in a certain member state, 
carries out its operations in another member state. Moreover, the ECJ 
held that the minimum capital requirements for pseudo-foreign 
companies mandated by the WFBV were in violation of the freedom of 
establishment, as they were not justified by the exception of Article 46 or 
any other requirement in the general interest. 
 In the ECJ’s judgment in Inspire Art the ECJ has extended the earlier 
case law by applying the Überseering rule to the entire legal system of 
the member states. Unlike Centros and Überseering, however, Inspire 
Art involved questions of substantive company law. Indeed, after the 
Überseering judgment, the issue often raised involved the extent national 
law may be applied to so-called pseudo foreign companies in the areas 
other than legal personality or right of standing in court. Having ruled 
that the disclosure requirement in Article 1 of the WFBV is in violation 
of the Eleventh Directive and the minimum capital requirements are in 
violation of the freedom of establishment, the major implication of 
Inspire Art is that the WFBV cannot be maintained in its present form 
and other member states must follow suit in altering their laws that 
conflict with this judgment. We should note that Inspire Art holds out 
few implications for cases involving domestic companies wishing to 
leave its state of incorporation.  
   This section critically examined the ECJ’s recent case law on the 
freedom of establishment and its implications for the free movement of 
companies and the real seat doctrine. We have seen that while Centros 
did not involve a strict real seat context, the Courts ruling can easily be 
interpreted to imply that the validity of the view that an incorporation in 
one member state cannot be called into question in another simply 
because its central administration is not located in its state of 
incorporation. Even though the Centros case does not touch directly on 
the real seat doctrine, the broad contours of the ECJ’s developing 
jurisprudence in this area is arguably clear. Überseering continues to 
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develop this line of reasoning and Inspire Art extends this view, 
moreover, to substantive law. 
 We have argued that the real seat doctrine poses serious barriers to 
the freedom of establishment. However, the recent ECJ decisions have 
considerably reduced the scope of the real seat doctrine. To be sure, the 
mutual recognition of companies alone is insufficient to support the 
emergence of a market for incorporations in the EU. Serious obstacles, 
which has until now been left unaddressed by the ECJ, such as the 
absence of a reincorporation procedure and the issue of exit taxes 
continue to serve as serious barriers to the freedom of establishment and 
restrict the cross-border mobility of companies. Inevitably the ECJ will 
confront these issues, but we suspect that the Court will take few steps, 
as signaled in Überseering judgment, to restrict member state discretion 
in these areas. 
  
3.3 Barriers to Regulatory Competition in Europe 
The question, then, is whether regulatory competition is a superior 
alternative that can supersede top-down harmonization. To rephrase this, 
could competitive lawmaking lead to a welfare optimum in Europe? The 
answer to this question is arguably reflected in the development of the 
lawmaking process within the European Union.  
 If free choice and mutual recognition were viewed as the only 
precondition for regulatory competition, a potential ‘lemons’ problem 
could exist in the European market-for-business-forms.111 To illustrate 
this point, let us suppose that jurisdictions cannot reject firms organized 
under foreign company laws to avoid more restrictive formation and 
operation requirements. In that event, the lack of transparency in the 
European market could lead to a competition to laxity, to the extent that 
firms have no preferences with respect to the jurisdiction from which 
they buy their ‘products’. When it is difficult for the participants and 
creditors of a firm to obtain and compare information about the 
differences in quality between company forms from different member 
states and higher qualities imply higher costs, it is submitted that only 
                                                     
111 The ‘market for lemons’ hypothesis is developed by Akerlof (1970), who illustrated 
how asymmetric information, which makes it different to distinguish good quality from 
bad, can lead to a situation where only poor quality products (‘lemons’) become available 
in a product market. 
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the lowest possible quality will survive the competitive process.112 The 
fact that the European Union has opened the door to new members 
reinforces the problem of firm participants’ ability to distinguish the 
quality of the different member states’ products. In order to give firms 
organizing under their company laws a competitive advantage, member 
states have a tendency to undercut their rivals’ formation and operation 
requirements. This is especially true of small member states, which are 
better able to externalize the costs of inefficient company law, as the 
firm participants mainly operate outside their jurisdiction. Consequently, 
the argument goes, the European Union would be expected to settle at a 
sub-optimal equilibrium if market failures were not solved by centralized 
intervention.113  
 It is widely argued that jurisdictional competition suffers from several 
shortcomings which prevent the evolution of first-best law, as we have 
seen in section 3.1.114 How then will a race-to-the-bottom be prevented? 
In the case of the European Union, one could point to the ‘minimum 
requirements’ principle as applied by the ECJ. This principle allows 
member states to restrain foreign companies that do not conform to 
national rules from doing business in its jurisdiction.115 In addition, a 
member state could choose to apply its own corporation law to ‘pseudo-
foreign corporations’.116 The Dutch Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act 
of 1998 was one example of a statute that subjects these corporations to 
local creditor protection rules.117 However, the ECJ case law has 
                                                     
112 See Scharpf (1999: 92) (noting that asymmetric information among buyers and sellers 
and the buyers’ distrust of the information provided by the better-informed sellers could 
lead to a market for lemons). 
113 See Sinn (1997: 264-265 and 268-270) (arguing that if centralized lawmakers aim at 
correcting market failures, it would not be efficient to subject laws to a market decision, 
which, in turn, is likely to suffer from a market failure itself). 
114 The Tiebout model of regulatory competition, which predicts that competitive markets 
will settle at an efficient equilibrium, does not hold in the real world. Several 
shortcomings, like asymmetric information or observability, denude the Tiebout model of 
predictive capacity. See Bratton and McCahery (1997); Inman and Rubinfeld (2000: 
669). 
115 See Scharpf (1999: 96). 
116 Pseudo-foreign corporations are firms that are incorporated in one state but conduct a 
significant amount of their business in another state. 
117 See Rammeloo (2001: 76-79). In the United States, California and New York apply 
some provisions, including shareholder protection rules in particular, to pseudo-foreign 
corporations. See Johnson (1997: 272-275); O’Hara and Ribstein (2000: 1206) (‘[n]ot 
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mitigated the effect of this principle by expanding the proportionality 
test, which limits the autonomy of member states to impose minimum 
requirements, even if they serve social purposes.118  
 To be sure, the court-led deregulation approach requires the removal 
of national measures that impede market access, free choice, and hence, 
regulatory competition. However, even if some competitive pressures are 
present, inertia to innovate keeps playing a major role in the evolution of 
company and partnership law. In fact, we argue that the current law 
reform projects are a result of interest group pressures and responsive 
lawmaking, rather than a product of fully-fledged regulatory 
competition.119 It appears that innovative lawmaking is unlikely to occur 
if the obstacles to firm mobility and free choice are not overcome. 
 It should also be stressed that besides the standardization and status 
quo preference, the development of company law has been constrained 
by several other factors. First, formation costs in Europe make firms 
immobile. As discussed, reorganizing under a foreign company law 
statute often triggers taxes on hidden reserves, effectively restricting the 
demand for firms to opt into different national governance systems.120 
 Second, direct and indirect taxes are perhaps the most obvious barrier 
to cross-border mobility. Exit taxes in particular are the most politically 
charged issues, especially for large member states, such as France and 
Germany. Interestingly, the ECJ has recently revisited the issue of exit 
taxes in the context of their permissibility upon transfer of residence by 
an individual, self-employed person. In Lasteyrie du Saillant,121the ECJ 
held that discriminatory taxation of a taxpayer leaving the jurisdiction is 
proscribed. In that case, Mr de Lasteyrie left France in 1998 to settle in 
Belgium, transferring both his professional practice and tax residence. At 
that time, he held securities that exceeded 25% of the profits of a 
                                                                                                                      
surprisingly. Pseudo-foreign restrictions are limited to California and New York, which 
have enough market power to avoid being punished by exit of the affected firms.’). 
118 See Barnard and Deakin (2001: 36-38); Deakin (2001: 203 and 216-217). 
119 Gilson (2001: 354 fn 87) perfectly illustrates this point. He uses the Embarcadero 
Freeway, which separated downtown San Francisco from the waterfront, as an example. 
While many San Francisco residents wanted the freeway to be torn down, they were only 
able to break the opponents’ block after the 1989 earthquake inflicted sufficient damage 
on the freeway. 
120 Cf. Gilson (2001: 356) (noting that in Germany, a significant tax barrier would remain 
despite Centros). 
121 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministerie de l’Economie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie, Case C-9/02, [2004] ECR 00000, Judgment of 11 March 2004. 
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company subject to corporation tax in France, and their market value 
was above their acquisition price. The Code General de Impots (CGI) 
included a provision that prescribes a levy of income taxes on such 
differences in value of securities when a French resident leaves the 
country. The plaintiff challenged this provision and the case was referred 
to the ECJ, which held that the legislation in question impeded the 
exercise of free establishment. The Court in Lasteyrie du Saillant 
reasoned that the rule was discriminatory because taxpayers who transfer 
their residence abroad are taxed on latent increases in value, while 
taxpayers remaining in France are taxed only on increase in value after 
they have actually realized such gains. It is crucial to observe, however, 
that the ECJ distinguished between natural persons and corporate 
residents, which is common practice in tax judgments, and therefore 
does not touch upon the Court’s judgment in Daily Mail. Thus, Lasteyrie 
du Saillant provides that exit taxes cannot hinder the exercise of the free 
establishment exercised by a natural person and must comply with the 
criteria established in Centros. Clearly this case is important because it 
challenges the discretion of member states to use of exit taxes on the 
basis of freedom of establishment, if only in relation to individual 
taxpayers. It is difficult to assess whether the ECJ will extend its 
freedom of establishment jurisprudence to legislation hindering 
corporate emigration, such as seat transfers and mergers. Recall that exit 
taxes are a central defense in restricting firm mobility and free choice 
and we suspect that the ECJ issue a decision, in the near term, that 
substantially alters the pre-existing corporate contracts negotiated at the 
member state level, unless the contracts have already been altered. 
  Third, the absence of a common history, culture, language and 
economic system obviously limits the ability of firms to choose a foreign 
legal business form.122 The fact that the difference between legal regimes 
limits the extent to which lawyers can practice outside their home 
jurisdictions reinforces the firms’ preference for their home countries.123 
Fourth, European patterns of corporate regulation and equity 
capitalization do not open up market opportunities for revenue-seeking 
jurisdictions. National governance systems do not allow for much 
shareholder litigation, and some systems restrict shareholder voting 
                                                     
122 See, e.g., Charny (1991: 456); Ribstein (2001: 853). Transparency regarding the 
nature and effects of the legislation is one of the preconditions for regulatory 
competition. See Woolcock (1996: 302-303). 
123 See Ribstein (2002a: 63-64). 
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rights.124 Fifth, Europe’s normative landscape is complex. Crucially, 
labour co-determination in Germany and employee participation 
structures elsewhere create a barrier to a regulatory system directed to 
the preferences of managers and shareholders.125 This dampens the 
demand for responsive lawmaking in the European Union in general. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that national lawmakers and incumbent 
interest groups are happy with the current institutional arrangement that 
impedes legal reforms aiming to improve the welfare of firms.  
 Other harmonization costs reflect the institutional and legal problems 
that characterize jurisdictions with monopolistic lawmakers. European 
company law is immune from the evolutionary pressures of competitive 
lawmaking, largely due to the implementation of the directives, which 
have given the substantive corporate law of the member states a 
mandatory and petrified quality.126 The involvement of the European 
Union in developing a harmonization program has tended to restrict 
innovations in company law in general. The harmonization process 
applies mainly to public corporations,127 but both national and European 
lawmakers have extended the directives’ reach to other limited liability 
vehicles when introducing policy reforms.128 Quite apart from the 
normative concerns of employing a harmonization process to develop a 
system of uniform rules, the imposition of mandatory rules – without the 
opportunity of opting out – has had the effect of increasing the incidence 
of standardization, and created a number of legal and institutional 
barriers to free choice.129 Consequently, given the ‘petrification 
externality’, the prospects for changing the main elements of company 
law in Europe are rather slim even in light of the modernization reforms 
recently proposed by the European Commission.  
   
4 CONCLUSION 
This article has provided an overview of the changing landscape of EU 
company law. We pointed out at the beginning of this article that the 
potential for the member states to engage in competitive lawmaking is 
                                                     
124 See Centre for Law and Business (1998: 2-9). 
125 See Wymeersch (1998: 1045). 
126 See Buxbaum and Hopt (1988: 232-243); Coffee (1999: 651); Wouters (2000:267). 
127 See, e.g., Bisacre (1999: 89-90); Halbhuber (2001: 1406). 
128 See also Wouters (2000: 265-266). 
129 See, e.g., Wouters (2000: 264-267). 
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limited. On this basis, we argued that member states, upon the entrance 
to the EU, enter into a long-term non-competition agreement regarding 
company law. There is no evidence that the emergence of new 
judgments from the ECJ, which allegedly reflect changes within the EU 
about lawmaking strategies, tip the equilibrium towards regulatory 
competition. 
 In section two, we described that in an island’s lawmaking process, 
the production of legal rules may fall short of the optimal required level 
due to role played by lawmakers, intermediaries and organized groups. 
To the extent that law reform efforts are undertaken by government 
committees and private lawmaking bodies, foreign legal rules will be 
borrowed and adapted to a jurisdiction’s doctrines and principles. The 
divergence in legal rules and institutions among jurisdictions reflects not 
so much the differential needs of businesses as the institutional and legal 
traditions. Even if exogenous events should occur, a jurisdiction’s 
lawmaking process is unlike to react positively to these new pressures. In 
addition, the standardization process, which creates both positive and 
negative externalities, accounts for lawmakers’ preference for the 
dominant legal rule. 
 Based on our review of the changing pattern in EU lawmaking we 
have argued that, even when these island jurisdictions become part of a 
common market, they are unwilling, given their long tradition of 
independence, to relinquish their lawmaking autonomy. The 
commitment of member states to respect the cooperative lawmaking 
equilibrium is reflected in the following observations: (1) the first and 
second generation company law directives restated the dominant legal 
practices in the member states; (2) the third and fourth generation 
directives became less detailed and precise leaving the important issues 
to the member state’s discretion; (3) federal intervention through 
supranational provisions for truly European company forms faced severe 
objections and are, until now, not very successful; (4) all the steps taken 
by the member states point in the same direction: to avoid a “European 
Delaware”. 
 Section 3 clarifies that Europe’s fear of creating a EU-Delaware is 
misguided. Delaware does currently not engage in regulatory 
competition with the other US states. Due to a series of historical 
coincidences, As we have seen, Delaware can rely on its dominant 
position in the market for companies. Delaware closely resembles a 
monopolistic lawmaker possessing market power and ‘competitive’ 
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advantages that other states cannot replicate, which act as substantial 
barriers to other states wishing to enter the market for out-of-state 
companies. 
 In the EU, the harmonization program for publicly held companies 
set in place mechanisms that protected the lawmaking autonomy of 
member states. Since these firms were most likely to engage in cross-
border activities, re-incorporation strategies could put pressure on 
domestic lawmakers to conform to their peer jurisdictions. With the 
European market becoming reality, however, small and medium-sized 
firms are increasingly reviewing their strategies so as to reach their full 
potential, thereby choosing the jurisdiction of incorporation. To be sure, 
the real seat doctrine, that is still dominant in the EU, initially prevented 
start-up firms to choose their company law. However, recent ECJ’s case 
law provides for mutual recognition: jurisdictions cannot reject firms 
that, in order to avoid more restrictive formation and operation 
requirements, organized under foreign company laws. This could 
potentially cause irritation to the non-competitive equilibrium, but we 
suspect that these out-of-equilibrium challenges will not touch the core 
of the legal rules and institutions supporting the stability.  
 We argued furthermore that the effect of the ECJ’s judgments is 
rather slim. Indeed, it might be argued that, as the ECJ allowed firms to 
opt for a foreign company structure solely to evade the application of the 
minimum capital requirements, it distorted the no-competition 
equilibrium and encouraged the member state lawmakers to respond. 
Nevertheless, apart from measures designed to implement the European 
developments, the domestic lawmakers are apparently more engaged in 
window-dressing activities without touching their core legal principles, 
thereby pretending that they are business-friendly and at the same time 
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